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The present paper bridges considerations characteristic of the domains of 
linguistic pragmatics, discourse analysis, as well as of cognitive linguistics 
and social psychology. It is claimed that, in specialist discourse analysis, a 
given discourse type is as such analytic determinant, i.e. one that dictates its 
own methods of investigation. These methods display a “more-bottom-up” 
or a “more-top-down” orientation (cf. Beaugrande 1997), depending on what 
kind of discourse is investigated. It is argued that certain discourse types 
which “include” the analyst (that is, where the analyst is part of depicted 
events or part of discourse audience) or are more “familiar” to him/her gen-
erate observations on their function and structure at a relatively early stage 
of their componential analysis, or even before it takes place. Once the global 
function of the text has been presupposed, the analysis proceeds “top-down”, 
i.e. toward all micro-data chunks supportive of the initial hypothesis. This 
happens, for instance, in the case of the discourse of advertising (cf. studies 
by Lutz 1990, Myers 1994; Goddard 1998, and many others). On the other 
hand, discourse analyses pursued in a “bottom-up” manner seem to result 
from an analyst having insufficient extralinguistic knowledge to postulate a
priori claims about the text and its function. This constraint concerns ana-
lysts not being part of the reality investigated and, more often than not, un-
dertaking a diachronic study or a study of highly-metaphoric discourse. The 
primary objective of the paper is to postulate, on the basis of investigation 
into a couple of different discourse types (language of politics and the me-
dia, advertising, and scientific argument), about the degree of analytic de-
terminism pertaining to a given kind of text. In other words, it is to indicate 
which discourse types invite (or even dictate) which of the analytic ap-
proaches (i.e. “top-down” and “bottom-up”). The secondary goal is to sug-
gest that the analysis of discourse determination can further benefit from the 
application of concepts which are normally part of Cognitive Grammar (CG) 
apparatus. It will be shown that CG can substantially contribute toward 
specification of the distance that holds between the analyst and the investi-
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gated discourse. Addressed here will be Langacker’s concept of subjectifica-
tion (cf. Langacker 1990b, 1999) and its relevance to considerations of the 
analyst’s status in discourse. 
Key words: analytic conceptualization; deductive analysis; discourse determina-
tion; discourse of advertising; inductive analysis; political discourse; pragmatic-
cognitive interface; scientific discourse; subjectification. 
1. Introduction 
In the standard, everyday process of text comprehension and interpretation, the 
intepreter’s prejudgements of meaning and function are progressively nuanced 
or even eliminated by the bottom-level analysis of textual detail (cf. e.g. Van 
Dijk and Kintsch 1983). How this dialectic operates depends on the functional 
transparency of the discourse type and on the interpreter’s literacy practices re-
garding the discourse type (in the sense that the interpreter’s degree of familiar-
ity with the discourse constitutes a factor influencing the actual text interpreta-
tion). When it comes to specialist processes of discourse analysis, analysts need 
to be aware of what follows from the fact that they are inevitably normal text in-
terpreters as well as specialist discourse analysts. The consequence and analytic 
jeopardy at the same time can namely be substituting normal text interpretation 
for specialist discourse analysis rather than treating normal text interpretation as 
part of the object of research in discourse analysis.
The primary point of this paper to account for the above danger from the per-
spective of specialist discourse analysis. It seems fair to assume that, in view of 
the unique status of the interpreter-analyst, it is more in the case of specialist 
discourse analysis than any other discourse analysis that a given discourse type 
is in itself analytic determinant, i.e. one that prescribes and dictates methods of 
its own investigation. The determination of the analyst by the discourse type 
consists in the effect generated by the distance which holds between the reality 
depicted in the discourse and the analyst’s past and present experience with this 
reality. Based on the degree of familiarity with a given type of discourse, the 
analyst selects and develops (often unconsciously) the methodology for building 
up the actual text interpretation. Such methodology can possess a “more-
bottom-up” or a “more-top-down” orientation (cf. Beaugrande 1991, 1997), de-
pending on what kind of discourse is investigated. A full account of discourse 
determination necessitates going beyond the traditional apparatus of discourse 
analysis and pragmatics, toward concepts which stem from the multi-faceted re-
search into the cognitive grounding of language in general. 
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1.1. Discourse determination: preliminaries
Certain discourse types which “include” the analyst (that is, where the analyst is 
part of depicted events or part of discourse audience) or are more “familiar” to 
him/her generate observations on their function and structure at a relatively early 
stage of their componential analysis, or even before it takes place. Once the 
global function of the text has been presupposed, the analysis proceeds “top-
down”, i.e. toward all micro-data chunks supportive of the initial hypothesis. 
This happens, for instance, in the case of the discourse of advertising. Analysts 
of the discourse of advertising (cf. Myers 1994; Goddard 1998, and others) tend 
to pose a strong and clear-cut hypothesis regarding the effect of a given subtype 
of advertising, and only later verify it against the actual lexical data. In fact, the 
more evident or plausible the hypothesis, the less data is used afterwards to ver-
ify it. Furthermore, the more evident the hypothesis, the less chance of its being 
reiterated in a thesis-like format after data description has been completed. 
Conversely, discourse analyses pursued in a “bottom-up”, inductive manner 
seem to result from the analyst’s having insufficient extralinguistic knowledge 
to postulate a priori claims about the text and its function. This constraint con-
cerns analysts not being part of the reality investigated and, more often than not, 
undertaking a diachronic study or a study of highly-metaphoric discourse. For 
instance, an analyst who is alien to cultural background of a text will normally 
be reluctant to formulate a function-oriented hypothesis, or at least he/she will 
choose to withhold such a claim until substantial investigation into text data has 
been completed (cf. Wilson 1990). Similarly, analyst of a metaphoric expression 
will hardly ever hypothesize about its pragmatic effect on the text before he/she 
first confronts, in a truly decompositional manner, all conceivable entailments 
of the source domain of the metaphor with those of the target domain (cf. Mac-
Cormack 1985). 
1.2. Organization of the paper: The pragmatic-cognitive interface 
The first part of the paper (sections 2.1-2.4) assesses, on the basis of investiga-
tion into a couple of persuasive discourse types (language of politics and the 
media, advertising, discourse of science), the degree of analytic determinism 
pertaining to a given kind of text. It indicates which discourse types invite 
which of the analytic approaches (i.e. “top-down” and “bottom-up”) in a more 
explicit manner. As has been mentioned before, the discourse of advertising 
seems to prompt, for the most part, a “top-down” approach. But on the other 
hand, the analysis of language of scientific argument, which relies heavily on 
continuous accumulation of macropropositional cues, is principally character-
ized by inductive, “bottom-up” processes.  
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The second part (section 3) suggests that the analysis of discourse determina-
tion can best be pursued with the application of concepts which have been de-
veloped as part of Cognitive Grammar (CG) apparatus (cf. Langacker 1987, 
1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1999, 2001). It is shown that CG can substantially 
contribute toward specification of the distance that holds between the analyst 
and the investigated discourse. Viewed in this way, the biggest asset of CG’s 
apparatus is Langacker’s concept of subjectification (cf. Langacker 1990b, 1999, 
2001) which shows direct relevance to considerations of the analyst’s status in 
discourse. The cornerstone of such relevance is the apparent correspondence be-
tween the dynamic status of the analyst in relation to the background of the ana-
lyzed text and the comparably dynamic mechanism of conceptualization of the 
on-stage region (OS) by the Speaker/Conceptualizer in CG model of viewing ar-
rangement of the stage in the process of predication. There exists a clear analogy 
between the Speaker’s/Conceptualizer’s assumption of place within the OS 
and/or within the scope of predication on the one hand, and the positioning of 
the analyst as part of the analyzed piece of discourse on the other. An acknowl-
edgement of this analogy is a pre-requisite for application of Langacker’s model 
of subjectification to the measurement and illustration of the status of the analyst 
in relation to the analyzed discourse and hence, to the specification of the degree 
of “top-down” or “bottom-up” determination which underlies a study of a given 
discourse type. 
2. Analytic determination of select types of persuasive discourse 
2.1. Determination of political discourse: deductive and inductive proc-
esses
The analysis of political discourse is affected by a relatively balanced combina-
tion of deductive and inductive processes. This can be seen from the following 
sample analysis of the final decree of Afghan Islamic clerics (Ulema), on US 
demands for the handover of Osama bin Laden, the world number one terrorism 
figure, apparently responsible for the attacks on US Pentagon and World Trade 
Center which took place on September the 11th, 2001: 
(1) Afghanistan’s Ulema is sad over the losses in the United States 
and hopes that the United States will not launch an attack on Af-
ghanistan. Ulema hopes that the US will show patience and 
flexibility and will take more time to properly investigate the in-
cident.
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The Afghan Ulema demands the United Nations and the OIC 
(Organization of the Islamic Conference) hold an inquiry into the 
incident in the United States to know who were behind the inci-
dents and to prevent the killing of innocent people in the future. 
The United Nations and the OIC should take note of the Ameri-
can president’s remarks, who said that the war will be a crusade. 
In order to prevent such kind of incidents and that there should 
be no misunderstanding in the future, this Ulema council requests 
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to persuade Osama bin Laden 
to leave Afghanistan and select a new place for himself. 
If the United States attacks Afghanistan after these proposals, 
any US action will be against the sacred Islamic law. It will 
amount to an act against Islam. We have found it in all Islamic 
jurisprudence if the non-Muslims attack Muslim land, jihad is 
obligatory on the Muslims and Quran, Sayings of the Prophet and 
all the books of jurisprudence urge the Muslims to wage the ji-
had.
If the non-Muslim invades or attacks the land of Muslims, in this 
situation Muslims can seek assistance from the Muslims and non-
Muslim governments but with the condition that the Islamic or-
ders should remain supreme. This has been proven in the books 
of Islamic jurisprudence.1
The quoted text has a background as well as idiosyncratic properties which en-
courage analysis involving both “top-down” (deductive) and “bottom-up” (in-
ductive) processes. The prompts for “top-down” study include primarily a uni-
form perception of the background, i.e. the terrorist attack which has been de-
nounced worldwide, providing a broad understanding for and expectation of a 
retaliatory action against a country harboring the perpetrators. In view of a pro-
spective US intervention, the Ulema statement could be seen as a move to avoid 
war by promising a handover of chief terrorist Osama bin Laden. However, 
since such move would discredit the Ulema and the ruling Taliban group in the 
eyes of some of the more radical Arab audience, a safer presupposition about 
the text would be that it stands open to interpretation rather than any direct read-
ing. In other words, the delicacy of the situation in which the text was written 
could make an analyst postulate its flexibility with the fulfilment of expectations 
of all addressee groups. This in turn means that the analyst could safely presup-
1 Translation from Pashtu by the Associated Press. 
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pose about the occurrence of specific language forms and logical formulae in 
the text, such as implicature, impersonalization, or ambiguity of reference of 
some deictic expressions. 
Also, the Ulema statement invites “top-down” approach on account of the ex-
tended text length which makes feasible the hypothesis-data-thesis formula. The 
length and structure of the text sample prevents an inductive computation of 
meaning since, as we shall see in a moment, the major inferential cues are ran-
domly scattered across the text. Additionally, there are text elements which have 
no “cue” status whatsoever, and this encourages selectivity in data presentation. 
The fact that the status of macropropositional cues in the text calls for a “top-
down” analysis follows from little possibility of interpreting them relative to 
any immediate context. For instance, should take note of may be judged (gener-
ally) to constitute a directive, but whether its (specific) function is to simply de-
nounce the remarks or possibly draw some share of importance by identifying 
with them cannot be successfully inferred from the text surrounding. From the 
deductive standpoint, it seems logical to assume the former interpretation and 
this is what an analyst is prompted to do, given the knowledge of the Taliban at-
titude to Americans. A similar problem arises with single words such as were in 
the second paragraph or select in the fourth paragraph. The use of were rather 
than ‘was’ could follow from an option provided by grammatical rules, yet it 
could also imply that Osama bin Laden had, according to the Taliban, nothing to 
do with the terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the use of select could suggest that 
there are multiple places in the world where Osama is welcome, but again, the 
overall coherence of the passage is such that it cannot be determined which in-
terpretation should be the correct one. The loose connections between major 
cues for the macroproposition encourage looking beyond the text to postulate 
deductive, a priori claims about its function. 
For all these “top-down” prompts, it would be a mistake to say that the Ulema 
statement contains no text elements which fit the canons of “bottom-up” analy-
sis. In fact, albeit the loose connectedness holding between the particular sec-
tions of the text encourages a “top-down” approach, a corresponding lack of co-
herence within single sentences seems to prompt an inductive computation of 
meaning, comparable to one which occurs in, say, the analysis of metaphor. 
This can be readily observed from the structure of the first sentence in the 
Ulema text which, though non-metaphoric in itself, invites speculation almost 
identical to that generated in multiple metaphor studies (cf. MacCormack 1985). 
The reason is the presence of the two apparently disparate thematic segments (is
sad over the losses and hopes that the United States will not launch an attack)
linked together by conjunction and. Since this structuring evokes natural bewil-
derment, there arises a temptation to search for the sentence function via estab-
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lishing some common ground between the themes (as happens while comparing 
entailments of the source and target domain in a metaphor). In fact, having rec-
ognized little such ground, an analyst may ultimately define the speaker’s inten-
tion as one to present the threat of American intervention in terms of an action
rather than (justified) reaction. Yet whatever the specific conclusion, such kind 
of analysis as a whole should be considered manifestation of “bottom-up” proc-
esses, as the latter clearly underlie the analyst’s investigation of analogies and 
disanalogies holding between the themes. 
Also, an analyst investigating the Ulema statement must leave a margin for 
‘the unexpected’. In other words, a text motivated by the political situation so 
complex as in the Taliban case (being, however, no more complex than in the 
case of the majority of political discourse) can hardly be judged on the basis of 
sole anticipation of meaning. For instance, if in actuality Osama bin Laden is
harbored in Afghanistan, an expectation of the Taliban trying to buy time by 
their response seems perfectly logical. Consequently, a phrase such as requests
(...) to persuade (...) to leave can be approached as a manifestation of this strat-
egy, linguistically expressed in infinitive duplication (cf. Halliday 1985). If, 
however, the above condition does not hold and bin Laden has his shelter else-
where, the expectation of the time-buying strategy is nothing but wrong and the 
fact that the infinitive has been duplicated is, for the analyst, quite unlikely to 
testify to such function. As a result, the phrase is going to be either completely 
ignored in analysis or, possibly, associated with some other function. But con-
sidering that the analyst is unaware of bin Laden’s whereabouts, he or she is 
likely to approach the cue without a ready-made conclusion at hand and hence 
devote more attention to its linear investigation. This again entails more time to 
be spent on the “bottom-up” componential analysis, thoroughly grounded in the 
study of all the lexical items involved. 
This last “bottom-up” prompt might indeed show that the methodological 
hazards which are consequential for the ultimate meaning interpretation are 
more likely to occur in studies of primarily inductive orientation and less likely 
in deduction-based analyses, but a more important conclusion is that in the case 
of most political texts both these approaches will merely complement each 
other. It seems that situations in which an analyst would be exposed to, say, a 
hundred percent figurative text, being at the same time ignorant of its back-
ground (which would invite a solely inductive analysis), or, for instance, to a 
text which fully reiterates his or her daily experience (which would invite a 
solely deductive analysis) are non-representative of a vast majority of the stand-
points underlying analyses of political discourse. This leaves us with the follow-
ing conclusion (henceforth referred to as (a)) about the methodological determi-
nation of political discourse analysis: 
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(a) Political discourse analysis invites a combination of analytic induc-
tivism following from analyst’s ignorance of audience predisposi-
tions and/or analyzability of text regardless of its background, and 
of analytic deductivism following from awareness of contextual fac-
tors or being part of depicted events and/or impossibility of carrying 
out an autonomous analysis of text due to its idiosyncratic proper-
ties.
2.2. Determination of the discourse of advertising: hypothesis and deduc-
tion
Although constituting only a small portion of the post-war research into the dis-
course of advertising, studies such as by Ogilvy (1964), Leech (1966), Turner 
and Pearson (1966), Goffman (1976), Williamson (1978), Dyer (1982), Schud-
son (1984), Vestergaard and Schroeder (1985), Chapman (1986), Lutz (1990), 
Myers (1994) and Goddard (1998) give a fair picture of the analytic attitude to 
the rhetoric of advertising which has developed over the past fifty years. All 
these analyses and case studies demonstrate a tendency to presuppose a priori
about the manipulative character of advertisements, allegedly reflected in a 
clever application of several standard features, such as the use of allitera-
tion/assonance, rhyme, reiteration of weasel words, unfinished comparisons, 
parity claims, etc. Consequently, practically all of the undertaken research into 
these features turns to account for the mere distribution of macropropositional 
cues, rather than any reciprocal interaction thereof. This analytic inclination fol-
lows, presumably, from the relative easiness of developing a hypothesis con-
cerning the function of advertising, which the latter is commonly (and by no 
means truthlessly) seen as a quasi-deceptive tool to make the addressee pursue 
an action (i.e. buy a product) or develop some kind of favorable mental state 
toward an action (i.e. admit possibility of buying a product at a later date). The 
point is, however, that although this hypothesis is probably true, the readiness of 
developing it seriously hinders further investigation into the many consistently-
structured, homogeneously grammatical elements which underlie such effective 
advertising.
In fact, little needs to be said about why analysts should be so prone to postu-
late a priori claims concerning language of advertising. Over years, as world 
markets have come to be dominated by same product brands, so have the mar-
keting and advertising outlets. A Coca-Cola ad is nowadays much more likely to 
attract (in the same form) worldwide attention than it used to, say, thirty years 
ago. And since majority of language analysts are exposed to similar advertising 
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experience, with similar products, in similar time, it comes hence as little sur-
prise to see similar analytic layouts pursued worldwide. 
One of the most striking manifestations of the “top-down” determination af-
fecting the studies of the discourse of advertising is the placement of thesis 
statement prior to data analysis. This can be best seen from the works by Lutz 
(1990) and Goddard (1998). The data analysis is hardly ever (occasionally in 
Lutz) followed by any reiteration of the thesis, since the thesis is considered too 
evident to pose a need for reiteration. The assumption of clarity and straightfor-
wardness of the thesis further affects data presentation, in the sense that data 
components are shown to occur randomly, rather than interact with one another. 
In other words, the analysis adheres predominantly to the visuality of the 
text/image sample, at the expense of an autonomous investigation of the 
lexis/grammar used. 
These tendencies are most radically exemplified in Goddard’s (1998) study, 
where thesis statements about advertisements are all voiced in the “Introduc-
tion” (and never reiterated later), while the question of the definition of adver-
tisement is first tackled (in, arguably, somewhat trivialized manner) in “Chapter 
1”, with a sample analysis (or rather simple description of an ad) following yet 
later in “Chapter 2”: 
Make no mistake: advertising works [...]. It is not difficult to see that and why adver-
tisers should want to make their texts capture our attention. The whole aim of the 
copywriters is to get us to register their communication either for purposes of immedi-
ate action or to make us more favourably disposed in general terms to the advertised 
product or service. (1998:2, “Introduction”) 
Advertising is so familiar to modern readers that it may seem odd to ask what an ad-
vertisement is [...]. At the root of the word ‘advertisement’ is the Latin verb ‘ad-
vertere’, meaning ‘to turn towards’ [...]. Often, though, classifications [of advertise-
ments] are more a question of degree rather than of absolutes. For example, clothing 
in its broadest sense can be seen as advertising ideas about the wearer, but manufac-
turer’s labels on clothing are a direct strategy of getting free publicity. Therefore, cen-
tral to the idea of an advert appears to be the factor of conscious intention behind the 
text, with the aim of benefiting the originator... . (:7, “Chapter 1”) 
[...] One attention-seeking strategy [...] is the startling image, combined with emotion-
ally stirring text. The Benetton clothing company, for example, showed a series of 
large-scale hoardings which featured real scenes of life and death - a baby being born, 
covered in blood from the mother’s womb, a man on his deathbed, some of them 
shockingly coupled with a sequence of universally-appealing, emotion words... . (:13, 
“Chapter 2”) 
32 P i o t r  C a p :   D i s c o u r s e  a n a l y s i s  a n d  d e t e r m i n a t i o n
It seems from Goddard’s study that an approach so radical, in terms of the for-
mulation of hypothesis about the function of the text, might strongly affect the 
whole complexity of the build-up of subsequent analysis, or, in yet other words, 
any analytic activity involving the quantity and sequencing of data and theory. 
In turn, Lutz’s study (1990) offers what might be called a ‘deductive cathar-
sis’ in advertising analysis. Lutz is apparently the first analyst to pose an ultra-
clear set of hypotheses concerning the language of advertising (“advertisers try 
to wrap their claims in language that sounds specific and objective, when in fact 
the language of advertising is anything but”, “Unfinished comparisons abound 
in advertising since they create a possibility of filling the claims differently by 
different addressees”, “The biggest weasel word used in advertising is ‘help’; 
once the advertisement starts with ‘help’, it can develop to make whatever (in-
sincere) promise or claim, because ‘help’ qualifies all the follow-up of the sen-
tence” (1990: 85-89), and many more), to limit data’s function to a posteriori
presentation, and to go to the final extreme of almost ignoring data analysis after 
its presentation. As a result, Lutz’s analysis turns into a series of exemplification 
chunks, each looking more or less in the following way: 
HYPOTHESIS
(e.g.)
One of the most powerful weasel words is “virtually” [...]. “Virtually” is 
used in advertising claims that appear to make specific, definite promises 
when there is no promise. (Lutz 1990: 88) 
DATA
(ctd. from the same example) 
In 1971 a federal court rendered its decision on a case brought by a woman 
who became pregnant while taking birth control pills. She sued the manu-
facturer for breach of warranty. The woman lost her case. Basing its ruling 
on a statement in the pamphlet accompanying the pills, which stated that, 
“When taken as directed, the tablets offer virtually 100% protection,” the 
court ruled that there was no warranty, expressed or implied, that the pills 
were absolutely effective. In its ruling, the court pointed out that, according 
to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, “virtually” means “al-
most entirely” and clearly does not mean “absolute” (Whittington versus
Eli Lilly and Company, 333 F. Supp. 98). (1990: 88) 
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THESIS
(ctd. from the same example) 
[...] So whenever one encounters an ad claim that uses the word “virtually”, 
one should translate that claim into its real meaning, which is “in essence 
or effect, although not in fact.” (1990: 88) 
However, in an attempt to keep the addressee constantly preoccupied with his 
(hypo)thesis claims, Lutz uses a massive number of examples, each needing or 
in fact just naturally entailing a hypothesis-thesis wrap-up of the kind quoted 
above. By comparison, Goddard (1998) is quite reluctant to use multiple exam-
ples, especially if they should concern everyday commercial advertising. What-
ever the reason (reluctance of mental plagiarism?; fear of triviality?), this seems 
to prove that with the ‘hypothesis space’ almost filled up (here: by authors such 
as Lutz), the analyst is tempted to take all the established pre-conceptions about 
the function of the analyzed discourse ‘for granted’, voice them out concisely, 
and possibly look for some atypical instances of this discourse, which have not 
yet been accounted for. And this is what is clearly manifested in Goddard’s writ-
ing, as she makes up for the limited hypothesis space with an inflated data-
analysis space - yet never concerning the principal issue of commercial advertis-
ing, but an apparently marginal subject of non-profit advertising (this tendency 
is especially provoking in the light of Goddard’s “Introduction”, in which there 
is no hint whatsoever as to her being interested in this subtype of ad discourse). 
Overall, the inherent analytic determinism of the discourse of advertising can 
be summed up by the following observation (b): 
(b) Analysis of the discourse of advertising is liable to an excessive appli-
cation of deduction-based hypothetical claims, to the treatment of 
hypothesis and thesis in like terms, to the underrepresentation of 
relevant data or the use of data atypical of the hypothesis, and finally, 
to the selection of data reflecting predominantly cognitive-visual ex-
perience. 
2.3. Determination of the discourse of science: induction from data amass-
ment
In this necessarily longer section the analysis of the discourse of scientific ar-
gument is illustrated with a sample study of the language of medical argumenta-
tion. As is the case with a majority of scientific language, the discourse analysis 
of medical argument is rather underrepresented in relevant literature (with the 
exception of fragmentary studies in Johnson 1998, Mayer 2001, Sager 1987, and 
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Wagner 1998) and this is reflected in the structuring of the present section, esp. 
in comparison to what has been demonstrated in sections 2.1 and 2.2. In its 
opening part (subsection 2.3.1), there is a quotation of an original text sample. 
The later subsections 2.3.2-5, give a half-critical, half-methodological analysis 
of the sample, testing it for particular argumentation and persuasion patterns, as 
well as their distribution and interaction with the remaining lexical data. Finally 
(subsection 2.3.6), on a strictly methodological note, a number of claims are 
made regarding possible alterations to the analysis which might occur as a result 
of different degrees of the analyst’s expert competence in the field. 
2.3.1. Text of an article Tumor marker terrorism by Dieter K. Hossfeld (1996)2
(1) 
In this contribution, only serological tumor markers will be addressed. 
Serological tumor markers are substances of protein, lipid or carbohy-
drate character which occur in or on tumor cells and which are associ-
ated with origin, growth, progression, and therapy-related changes of 
tumors. 
(2) 
The ideal tumor marker should be specific, sensitive, and should have an 
absolute correlation with the extent (stage) of the disease. Such a tumor 
marker would be instrumental in the detection of cancer in an asympto-
matic, seemingly healthy population (screening), in diagnosis and stag-
ing, in the evaluation of therapeutic measures, and in the documentation 
of relapse. 
(3) 
To date, no such tumor marker exists. The main reason for this is that all 
serological tumor markers are also produced by normal cells; thus, inter-
pretation of assay results depends on the quantitative value reported and 
not merely on the presence or absence of the substance. Another reason 
why tumor markers so far failed in screening is the low prevalence of 
any cancer at a given point in time. 
2 Consecutive paragraphs have been numbered for the sake of analysis in 2.3.2-5. 
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(4) 
The low impact of serological tumor markers on screening has been 
demonstrated, for instance, in ovarian cancer. Even for prostate cancer, a 
widespread population screening could not be recommended, although 
prostate-specific antigen (PSA) is nearly an ideal tumor marker due to its 
organ specificity. Yet, PSA is not cancer-specific; it is expressed equally 
by normal, benign, hyperplastic prostate glands. The mean PSA value in 
patients with benign prostatic hyperplasia is 3.4 mg/ml, not significantly 
different from mean values found in patients with stage A prostatic can-
cer. With regard to ovarian cancer, screening of 1082 women revealed 
elevated CA 125 levels in 36, one of whom had ovarian cancer. The 
situation is similar for other tumor markers (CEA, CA 15-3, CA 19-9, 
AFP, beta-HCG), so that their low specificity and sensitivity in addition 
to a low prevalence of cancers should prevent clinicians considering 
them useful tools to detect a malignancy in an asymptomatic population. 
(5) 
With the exception of PSA, the usefulness of serum tumor markers in the 
diagnosis of a malignant disease is also limited. Apart from low tumor 
sensitivity and specificity this is related to a low organ specificity. The 
list of malignancies in which CEA, CA 125, CA 15-3, etc. can be ele-
vated, is rather long. There is also a long list of benign diseases in which 
increased amounts of these substances can be measured in the serum. It 
is realized that benign conditions are rarely a cause of extreme marker 
elevation. Yet, for most tumor markers, a positive correlation exists be-
tween tumor mass and marker level; in early stage colon cancer (Dukes 
A), just 28% of the patients exhibit a slightly elevated CEA value. In pa-
tients with stage I breast cancer, CA 15-3 is increased in less than 5% of 
the patients. 
(6) 
Thus, serum tumor markers did not live up to the initially high expecta-
tions that they would enable diagnosis of early stage cancer and thereby 
would result in improved prognosis. In symptomatic patients, tumor 
markers are rarely needed to make the diagnosis. Only in prostatic can-
cer and in extragonadal germ cell tumors the diagnostic value of serum 
tumor markers cannot be questioned. 
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(7) 
Monitoring the course of the disease following tumor resection or radio-
chemotherapy has been considered the main indication for the use of se-
rum tumor markers. Tumor markers which do not normalize following 
an operation point to persistent disease. A postoperative rise of markers 
indicated a recurrence or metastatic spread. A persisting or increasing 
marker in a patient under chemotherapy suggests resistant disease. 
(8) 
Ample evidence exists that the measurements of serum tumor markers in 
the follow-up of patients with breast and colon cancer, but also other 
cancers, lead to earlier diagnosis of relapse. The lead time between de-
tection of relapse by tumor marker assay and discovery by clinical means 
is commonly 3-8 months. However, there is no proof that the earlier di-
agnosis of relapse results in a generally improved prognosis. The lack of 
curative therapy, particularly for metastatic disease, accounts for this 
situation. The few patients with an operable local recurrence or an iso-
lated liver or lung metastasis do not contribute to recommend serial tu-
mor marker determinations in the follow-up of patients with a large vari-
ety of epithelial tumors. 
(9) 
There are only two malignancies where the value of tumor markers in 
the follow-up is unquestioned, and these are gonadal and extragonadal 
germ cell tumors in males and trophoblastic tumors in females. 
(10) 
Considering what has been known for years now about the role of serum 
tumor markers in screening, diagnosis and follow-up, the question arises 
why physicians continue to ask for them and why there is an ever-
increasing number of new marker tests offered by the industry. Besides 
the enormous economic burden - in some hospitals the money spent on 
tumor marker assays amounts to US$ 500 000 annually - our main con-
cern should be directed to our patients. With regard to screening, it is not 
acceptable for a woman or man who feels healthy to be suspected of hav-
ing a cancer, to be investigated extensively and then to be told that noth-
ing has been found. Even worse, it is almost cynical to perform serial 
tumor marker measurements during follow-up and, once ‘early’ recur-
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rence or metastatic disease has been discovered, only to inform the pa-
tient that a curative approach is no longer available. 
(11) 
To measure tumor markers without asking whether it is good for the pa-
tient resembles terrorism. It is realized that not rarely patients insist on 
tumor marker determinations and some of them even ask for a whole 
battery of markers not knowing that a healthy person who undergoes 13 
tumor marker tests has, by chance alone, a probability of only 51% of 
being classified as ‘normal’. It is also acknowledged that it may have 
medicolegal consequences to withhold tumor marker tests if the outcome 
of the disease is fatal. This is so because it is widely believed that the 
more diagnostics are done the, better the patient is taken care of, and if, 
under these conditions, the disease ends fatally, then nobody can be 
blamed. This situation reflects the other side of tumor marker terrorism. 
2.3.2. Amassment of data
In comparison with the text types studied in sections 2.1 and 2.2, Hossfeld’s text 
demonstrates an exceptionally high (though not for its genre) number of data 
claims. These claims, mostly statistical in nature, occur continually prior to en-
actments of the main thesis. If we accept that the main thesis of Hossfeld’s ar-
gument is that measurement of tumor markers is ineffective from a curative 
standpoint and that it should be abandoned for both moral and economic rea-
sons, and furthermore that the situation as of today is morally abhorrent, then 
the elements of the thesis are to be found in para. 4 (end), 6, 10, and the full the-
sis segment is available from para. 11. In all these places the text that precedes 
an element of thesis is dense in empirical data which is inherently indisputable. 
With an element of thesis to be suggested for the first time (cf. end of para. 4), 
the density of factual data is the greatest. This follows from the need for a strong 
enactment of credibility at a place where the addressee’s perception of the 
speaker has not yet been (favorably) established. The placement of indisputable 
data prior to a (controversial) thesis claim also applies to those chunks of text 
where the thesis is implied by means of randomization of an apparently anti-
thesis observation. This can be seen from para. 8 and 9, where para. 9 contains 
(conventional) implicature to the effect that tumor marker measurement is inef-
fective (There are only...) and the bulk of statements in para. 8 give factual data 
which is, in a sense, anticipatory of this implicature. The same correlation holds 
between the data-(implied)thesis chunks in para. 5 (whole) and para. 6 (last sen-
tence) respectively. Altogether, there are over 30 simple sentences and subordi-
38 P i o t r  C a p :   D i s c o u r s e  a n a l y s i s  a n d  d e t e r m i n a t i o n
nate clauses carrying empirical data, a number quite remarkable considering the 
overall length of the text sample. 
It is not only, however, the mere amassment of indisputable data occurring 
prior to thesis that lies at the root of Hossfeld’s ‘persuasion through credibility’ 
or, in other words, of ethos of the text.3 It is also, if not mainly, a diligent 
arrangement of data within itself that makes such amassment effective. It can be 
readily observed from the text that figure-based factual data nearly always pre-
cedes data which is given in a simple assertion form, with no statistics attached. 
A classic example of that is the interplay of paragraphs 4 and 5, in which former 
there is much more statistical data than in the latter. Such structuring reflects a 
set-up of credibility which normally takes place once thesis is interpreted rela-
tive to data; in Hossfeld it is also a chunk of data as such that derives credibility 
from another, earlier provided one. Altogether, Hossfeld’s persuasion demon-
strates a rhetorical continuum, whereby more controversial points undergo con-
stant neutralization by the precedent, unequivocal claims. 
This last observation holds true (partly, at least) for the internal structure of 
the last paragraph, which, in addition to synthesizing all thesis points in first two 
sentences, reveals a mechanism that is just as much analytically baffling as rep-
resentative of a majority of medical persuasion texts. Namely, it seems from the 
last sentence as if Hossfeld is trying to extend the thesis to cover yet another 
claim, to the effect that it is also medical industry that is to blame for continuous 
practice of pursuing inefficient measurements of tumor markers. But if Hoss-
feld’s point is really to foster such understanding, then a question arises why no 
neutralization device has been applied to prepare the addressee for so radical a 
claim, in a way the addressee has been prepared for other thesis elements. This 
leads us to consideration of the claim made in the last sentence in terms of an 
element functioning irrespective of the main thesis. A synchronic look at a vari-
ety of medical persuasion texts justifies such approach: there is a vast number of 
texts having the structure of the last paragraph nearly identical to Hossfeld’s. 
Moreover, if there is a written response (by another author) to the thesis voiced 
in the last paragraph, such response almost always ignores the ‘by-thesis’.4 This, 
however, does not mean that the claim made in the last sentence of para. 11 is 
3 Cf. e.g. Billig 1987; Cockcroft and Cockcroft 1992; Cap 1999a and 2002. These works, 
among others, offer a feasible merger of theories of credibility based on psychological 
consistency, and both classical and modern studies in rhetoric of persuasion. 
4 A sample proof of this regularity is available from, e.g., the book of proceedings of 21st 
ESMO (European Society for Medical Oncology) Congress in Vienna (1996), in which 
several contributors question Hossfeld’s argument; yet, without referring to the observation 
made in the closing sentence. 
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simply irrelevant; in fact it interacts with the thesis within a neutralization frame 
similar to the global frame of continuum of indisputable data followed by con-
troversial thesis. The difference is, however, that here the claim detracts from 
possible unacceptability of the main thesis by offering a novel look, which is di-
gressive and forward-oriented, and whose function is to shift the addressee’s at-
tention onto another thematic domain, at the ‘expense’ of belaboring with con-
troversies included in the thesis. The ‘by-thesis’ about the workings of medical 
industry does not prepare the thesis in the sense of pre-neutralizing controversy; 
it neutralizes the effect of the thesis post factum, and only in that sense it be-
longs to the overall argumentative continuum adopted by Hossfeld. 
2.3.3. Acknowledgement of opposition
If we look at the structures which have been discussed in terms of their being 
triggers of conventional implicature (cf. 2.3.2), such as the only-phrases in para. 
6 and 9, we find that it is also the very mention of the underrepresentation of 
these counter-examples that makes up another persuasive ploy in Hossfeld’s 
text. By building up a wobbly counter-argument which only apparently jeopard-
izes the principal thesis, Hossfeld enters into what Billig (1987) first called “dia-
logic discourse in monologue of persuasion”, a rhetorical strategy aimed at, 
again, establishing or enhancing speaker’s credibility. While applying this strat-
egy, the speaker presents himself as a person who is able to anticipate contro-
versy and, hence, to behave accordingly. The enactment of ‘I’ve been over it’ 
attitude adds to the speaker’s being perceived as competent and credible. In 
medical persuasion, one could also talk of an application of dialogic discourse in 
relation to expert knowledge, and the rhetorical consequences of this relation. In 
fact, what the speaker does by singling out such specific ‘counter-data’ as in 
Hossfeld’s text is not only the mere performance of his/her own expert skills 
and knowledge; it is also request for addressee’s share in this knowledge. In his 
paper and by the use of the quoted phrases in particular, Hossfeld invites a cer-
tain bond of intellectual intimacy which is to be set between him and the ad-
dressee. This bond, which bears indelible marks of rhetorical flattery, relies on 
recognition of a chunk of expert knowledge by both parties involved. Therefore, 
it can be claimed that dialogic discourse in Hossfeld (and in medical persuasion 
in general) means somewhat more than it does in the case of other types of per-
suasive discourse. It is not only that the speaker underlines his competence by 
acknowledging controversy; it is also that the speaker may use this occasion to 
build up a more direct and attractive appeal to the mind-set of the addressee 
(with an intention of changing it, though). 
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The extended view on dialogic discourse in medical language, in the form it 
has been proposed above, needs a digressive comment from the perspective of 
political language, where manifestations of dialogic discourse in monologue 
persuasion have long been considered as something standard (cf. Billig 1987; 
Cockcroft and Cockcroft 1992). In political language, dialogic discourse is usu-
ally manifested in the speaker’s addressing an indefinite party, by words which 
impose agreement on account of the fact that (i) the suggested idea is vague and 
therefore difficult to approach attitudinally, and (ii) there is a strong lexical 
backup of agreement from modality of the text, whereby the message is, in a 
sense, ‘framed into’ addressee’s predispositions. For instance: 
(2) On the experience and analysis of the first wave of the reforms, any-
one will agree that the proposed measures have proved ineffective; 
one will not deny that the program is not even a remedy, let alone a 
cure.
But as much as these sample words do acknowledge the existence and handling 
of controversy and thereby enact speaker’s competence, they obviously contain 
little that could foster ‘intellectual closeness’ of the speaker and his/her ad-
dressee. This is so because of the limited specificity of the message; there is vir-
tually no common ground where expert knowledge of the speaker and the ad-
dressee could possibly meet. In medical persuasion, the degree of specificity of 
the message is invariably higher, and so is the chance that the addressee will 
find it ‘attractive’. And this is what marks the principal difference that justifies 
the extended look on dialogic discourse in medical texts. 
2.3.4. Direct preparation of thesis paragraph
We have seen from the discussion in 2.3.2 that the major points constituting the 
thesis of Hossfeld’s argument are all synthesized in the last paragraph of the text 
(para. 11). This adds to the importance of (an analysis of) the claims which are 
made in the paragraph immediately preceding the thesis paragraph. As if in line 
with some unwritten rule that holds for medical persuasion texts, paragraph 10 
takes up a role of preparing the final thesis paragraph by a swift change in lexi-
cal register. Unlike para. 1-9 and 11, which conform to all norms of formal lan-
guage of scientific argument, para. 10 contains lexical structures which not only 
stand to verification by the mere reasoning but which are also emotionally-
appealing. Unlike elsewhere, in para. 10 Hossfeld uses a handful of phrases 
whose function is to give his claims a humanly dimension. This is done by tar-
geted personalization (‘a woman or man’), by setting up the common 
‘agent(physician)-experiencer(patient)’ activity domain into which the ad-
J e z i k o s l o v l j e  
5 . 1 - 2  ( 2 0 0 4 ) :  2 3 - 6 0 41
dressee is indiscriminately included (‘our main concern should be directed to 
our patients’), and, among other ploys, by the application of lexis which in itself 
is to be interpreted from a subjective standpoint (cf. the use of inverted commas 
in ‘early’). Moreover, in para. 10 there is a whole array of lexical expressions 
that stand in paradigmatic relation to their formal-language equivalents which 
can be found elsewhere in the text. For instance: 
para. 10 para. 1-9 and 11
told informed 
healthy asymptomatic 
feels healthy reports no symptoms 
a woman patient 
(a) man patient 
found diagnosed 
nothing no indication 
‘early’ belated 5
for a woman or man in patients 
Table 1. Lexical equivalence of para. 10 items 
Such structuring of the preparatory paragraph 10 draws, again, upon an aspira-
tion to establish a scope of common, intimate insight which should in turn bring 
concrete persuasion benefits for the speaker. As the speaker chooses to adopt a 
register which is atypical in the given context, the addressee is naturally forced 
to speculate why such register should be applied and hence how it interplays 
with the rest of the speaker’s argument. By presupposing co-operation from the 
speaker, the addressee is prompted to consider the atypical chunk as a valid part 
of argument, but what is really important is that the addressee, while searching 
for clues that would dispel his perplexity, works out an intellectual closeness to 
the speaker. This closeness makes the addressee recognize the speaker as a valid 
discussion partner, which increases the chances of the speaker’s claims being 
approached more favorably later in the text. 
Of course, another way in which para. 10 enacts the speaker’s credibility is 
by an increasingly radical reiteration of unquestionable points, amassing into 
5 This equivalent has been provided by myself. Hossfeld’s text does not contain the word 
‘belated’, though it seems that some longer chunks in the argument are reducible to phrases 
which ‘belated’ could be part of. 
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continuum described in 2.3.2. The thematicity of para. 10 is particularly benefi-
cial for a successful enactment of such points, as the speaker brings up claims 
which simply must be accepted given the situation where both speaker and ad-
dressee subscribe to the same principles dictated unequivocally by their profes-
sion (‘our main concern should be directed to our patients’). 
2.3.5. Lacunas of uninterpreted form
Finally, a comment should be made on those argumentation and persuasion 
strategies which rely on the speaker’s use of ‘unfinished meaning’, a meaning 
which is designated to be worked out by the addressee according to his/her pref-
erences. A number of interesting observations is available from a comparison of 
paragraphs 10 and 11, the former being relatively specific as to the reference of 
meaning, and the latter, quite conversely, packed up with structures (single 
words and phrases) carrying multiple manifestations of conventional and con-
versational implicature. A classic example of this discrepancy is the different 
structure of the ask-sentences which, incidentally, both tackle the same issue of 
the feeble effectiveness of tumor marker measurement (‘the question arises why 
physicians continue to ask for them [tumor markers]’ in para. 10, versus ‘To 
measure tumor markers without asking whether it [=tumor markers] is good for 
the patient resembles terrorism’ in para. 11). In para. 10, the predicate ask has 
its subject and is followed by a prepositional phrase. The agentive-objective 
elaboration determines the specificity of the claim; there is little meaning left for 
an extra interpretation by the addressee. In fact, there seems to be no need for 
any ‘dilution’ or neutralization of the principal meaning as the message resem-
bles a rhetorical question, devoid of any major illocutionary force. In para. 11, 
ask has been virtually nominalized (or, precisely, turned into a gerundive form), 
at the expense of its principal subject/agent. Of course, the most probable and 
plausible agent remains ‘the physician’, but there are also other interpretations 
that are possible, for instance, all parties involved in the practice: physicians, 
medical administration, pharmaceutical industry, etc. The lacuna of uninter-
preted form in para. 11 invites an addressee’s own interpretation, according to 
whatever he/she considers desirable. The claim is therefore relatively easy to 
accept, even though it finishes with a highly radical comparison. What adds to 
the acceptability of the claim is also the impersonal character of the immediate 
context: the infinitival subject in the main clause and the passive form in the fol-
lowing sentence. Altogether, the initial sentence of para. 11 has a clear status of 
implicature whereby the radicalism of the claim gets neutralized by the imposi-
tion of a vast spectrum of interpretations concerning its agentive elaboration. 
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From the overtone of the later writings by Hossfeld, it appears that the pri-
mary intention behind the implicature in the first sentence of para. 11 has been 
to criticize fellow practitioners, and not the whole medical industry as such. 
This, of course, does not detract from the power of the implicature in the present 
sample as there is no cancellation of the mistaken interpretation elsewhere in the 
text; in fact, there is even little space for it. An interesting generalization about 
medical persuasion is that implicatures used in argumentative texts such as 
Hossfeld’s indeed tend to target at the primary, close-reaching interpretation, 
even when offering multiple peripheral possibilities. In so doing, they function 
as neutralizers of the attached claims, rather than providers of novel ideas or ex-
tended spectrum views. But this function cannot be determined from an analysis 
of a single argumentative text as there is usually no cancellation of any of the 
implicata within it. 
2.3.6. Methodological remarks 
In general, medical texts such as Hossfeld’s tend to prompt a primarily “bottom-
up” inquiry. There are few language analysts who can claim expert knowledge 
within a medical domain and probably still fewer physicians who can be la-
belled as ‘linguists’. But even if a discourse analyst is supported in his/her in-
vestigation by in-field consultations, it is the very structure of medical persua-
sion that imposes an inductive work-out of the text’s function. This is because 
the main thesis is not revealed fully until the closing stages of the argument; 
even though the thesis is usually signalled in the title, it takes a laborious analy-
sis of the consecutive segments of data to get it successfully elucidated. In Hoss-
feld, the amassment and the foregrounding of data, which dominates paragraphs 
1-10, testifies to an informative function of the text. It is, however, the closing 
paragraph that turns it persuasive, to the specific effect coherent with the text’s 
title. It is also the last paragraph that fully explains the function of other thesis-
oriented claims which are scattered within paragraphs 1-10 (as in, for instance, 
first sentences of para. 5 and para. 10). Generally, the function of precisely tar-
geted persuasion which the text involves cannot be inferred unless linear proc-
essing of data has been completed by the addressee and/or the analyst. 
This major characteristic (or rather, an analytic entailment) of medical persua-
sion and indeed of a majority of scientific discourse applies not only to (an 
analysis of) the function of entire texts, but also to the function of the many mi-
nor chunks within them. For instance, in Hossfeld’s text the interaction that 
holds between data and thesis globally at text level is reflected in the more local
interaction between data and implied thesis in para. 10, and the principal thesis 
in para. 11. The local arrangement of the argument entails just as much induc-
44 P i o t r  C a p :   D i s c o u r s e  a n a l y s i s  a n d  d e t e r m i n a t i o n
tive effort from the addressee and/or the analyst as it is the case with the entire 
text, no matter how ‘egocentric’ is the analyst’s viewing of the discourse context 
in general. This last observation only adds to the essence of the following con-
clusion (c): 
(c) The analysis of scientific discourse is liable to the total absence or 
underrepresentation of hypothesis, to the amassment of ‘interactive’ 
data prior to thesis, and to the delayed manifestation of the thesis. 
2.4. Conclusions from the analytic assessment of persuasive discourse 
and a CG extension of analysis 
If one attempts to classify discourse analyses (a)-(c) according to the degree of 
determination by the source discourse, there emerges the following polarity: 
analysis of the discourse of advertising seems most affected by deductive ap-
proach and least affected by inductive approach, and the analysis of the dis-
course of science is affected precisely vice versa, i.e. it is overdetermined by in-
ductive approach and underdetermined deductively. Analysis of political dis-
course seems in turn to position itself somewhere in between the two poles. The 
position of a given discourse type on the determination axis depends, as is re-
flected in most of the observations within (a)-(c), on the analyst’s closeness to 
the discourse under investigation. To put it somewhat simplistically, being part 
of the discourse context, the analyst undergoes overdetermination by deductive 
processes and, conversely, being out of the discourse context he/she produces a 
study that is overdetermined inductively. Therefore, in order to account more 
fully for the differences in the degree of (persuasive) discourse determination it 
seems worthwhile to look exactly at the anchoring of the analyst in discourse 
and his/her conceptualization of the scope of analysis. Quite obviously, the ap-
paratus of the mainstream discourse analysis and linguistic pragmatics appear 
insufficient for a genuine success of such task. 
However, substantial reinforcement and elaboration on the conceptual aspects 
of (persuasive) discourse analysis seems to be at hand from Langacker’s (1987, 
1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2001) Cognitive Grammar (CG) 
model. Thus, it is the primary goal of the next section to postulate substantial 
congruence of conclusions drawn from the mainstream models of discourse 
analysis applied in subsections 2.1-3 with an analysis of the same persuasive 
discourse types pursued according to Langacker’s cognitive apparatus. The ob-
jective is necessarily modest and the discussion tentative, targeting at mere ac-
knowledgement of existing analogies and thus comment-like, as attempts at 
bringing Cognitive Grammar and discourse analysis together are still a very re-
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cent time phenomenon (cf. Langacker 2001). Such an apparent lack of contact 
seems somewhat astonishing since, while the grounding of all language in dis-
course and social interaction is central to the functionalist tradition and most 
discourse studies, the latter is certainly no less true for cognitive linguistics. Fur-
thermore, as Langacker argues (cf. Langacker 2001), cognitive linguistics and 
Cognitive Grammar make more than evident relationship with discourse through 
the basic assumption that all linguistic units are abstracted from usage events,
that is, actual instances of language use. 
There exist multiple analogies between the mechanisms which govern the 
analysis of a given discourse type and which have been described as such by 
mainstream discourse theories, and the mechanisms of conceptualization which, 
as part of Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar apparatus, have thus far been ad-
dressed predominantly in the explanation of such phenomena as structure of 
grammatical categories, predication or the Speaker/Conceptualizer-Hearer rela-
tion. The latter have not, however, been adequately applied in the study of natu-
ral discourse nor, of course, in the elucidation of the complexities pertaining to 
the determination of discourse analysis. At least one such analogy can be 
brought up for satisfactory description of the status of an analyst facing the task 
of persuasive discourse investigation. It consists in the apparent logical corre-
spondence between the dynamic status of the analyst confronting the back-
ground of the analyzed text (i.e. his/her distance to/from the actual scene of 
events) and the equally dynamic mechanism of conceptualization of the on-stage
region (OS) by the Speaker/Conceptualizer in CG model of viewing arrange-
ment of the stage in the process of predication (cf. Langacker 1987). Analogous 
to the situation whereby the analyst becomes part of the investigated discourse is 
namely the process that Langacker (1990b, 1999) terms subjectification and that 
involves the Speaker’s/Conceptualizer’s assumption of place within the OS
and/or within the scope of predication, a move which marks the change of view-
ing arrangement of the OS from objective (Objective Viewing Arrangement – 
OVA) to egocentric (Egocentric Viewing Arrangement – EVA). Although the dif-
ference remains that in CG model subjectification involves the conceptualizing 
party and not the discourse-analyzing one, this does not detract from the logical 
similarity of the process itself, as long as it is acknowledged that in the ‘analytic 
subjectification’ the OS encompasses the analyzed discourse area and that such 
concepts as trajector and landmark, originally being the main elements of the 
OS, now turn subordinate to the Speaker entity and the Hearer entity, both of 
which thus become part of the newly-created ‘discourse stage’. Hence it is the 
discussion of the analytic value stemming from an application of Langacker’s 
subjectification characteristics to the description of the status of a discourse ana-
lyst confronting a persuasive text that constitutes the core of the next section. 
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3. Analyst’s status in discourse in the light of Langacker’s subjectifi-
cation theory
Before elucidating the relevance of subjectification to the analytic construal of 
(persuasive) discourse, one needs to look at, first, how subjectification works (in 
its classic CG form) and second, how it relates to some other root concepts of 
CG, which, as was claimed before, have thus far been of little concern for a ma-
jority of discourse analysts. These involve the afore-mentioned notions of the 
two viewing arrangements OVA and EVA, as well as the shifting degree of 
asymmetry between the ground (consisting, in Langacker’s terms, of the con-
ceptualizer, the conceptualizing subject, the setting and circumstances of the 
verbal event, and the participants of the event6), and the OS region and/or the 
scope of predication. 
3.1. Construal of the on-stage region and the mechanism of subjectifica-
tion
At the root of Langacker’s concept of subjectification is the asymmetry (or the 
lack thereof) that holds between the conceptualizer, the conceptualizing subject, 
and the on-stage region and/or the scope of predication in the process of constru-
ing the stage of a verbal event. As Langacker (1990b) points out, the process is 
similar to that in which a person looks at or through a pair of glasses. In the first 
case, i.e. when a person looks at the glasses, they are merely a part of the entire 
viewing frame of this person. Such situation is an example of the objective con-
strual of the on-stage region (to which the glasses evidently belong). If, how-
ever, a person decides to put the glasses on and look through them, they become 
part of a cognitive apparatus of the person; in other words, they are construed 
subjectively from the person’s standpoint. In the latter case, the asymmetry that 
normally exists between the conceptualizer and the on-stage region in an objec-
tive construal of the stage disappears. The conceptualizing subject (or, in this 
case, rather a conceptualized one7) enters the on-stage region and is no longer 
construed objectively by the conceptualizer. 
In order to apply these observations to a verbal event, let us work with the fol-
lowing sentence: 
6 Cf. Langacker 1990b. 
7 The term “conceptualizing” would much better fit an actual verbal situation involving the 
construction of a sentence where glasses would function as an active subject element, e.g. The
glasses are on the table, etc. In a theoretical discussion (such as Langacker’s) of a non-verbal 
situation, the passive form seems to my mind more appropriate.
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(3) BMW is doing better than Mercedes. 
Let us first account for the situation in which sentence (3) is uttered by a third 
party, such as, for instance, a representative of another car manufacturer. The 
viewing arrangement of the stage and the relation between the 
Speaker/Conceptualizer and the on-stage region will then look as follows (Fig-
ure 1): 
scope of predication 
Fig. 1. Objective Viewing Arrangement (OVA) 
In example (3) the elements of the ground (G) such as the Speaker/Conceptual-
izer, the conceptualizing subject BMW, and the Hearer remain beyond the scope 
of predication of the sentence. At the same time, they are positioned off-stage 
(outside of the OS ellipsis), as the Speaker/Conceptualizer has not elected him-
self to be part of the communicated message and hence has not applied the con-
ceptualizing subject BMW to create such effect. The vertical line is thus a sym-
bol of an objective construal of the verbal event occurring in (3) by the 
Speaker/Conceptualizer and the Hearer. It relates the ground elements to a hori-
zontal axis which connects the trajector (tr) with the landmark (lm). These are 
the two basic figures profiled by the subject-predicate relation in sentence (3),
the trajector being the most salient entity (BMW) and the landmark (indicated by 
doing better than Mercedes) serving as point of reference for locating the trajec-
tor. The range of the horizontal axis also involves elements X and Y (indicated 
XY
                       OS
tr lm
G
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in verbal terms by ‘BMW’ and ‘Mercedes’ respectively) which stand within an 
objective relation to each other. This kind of relation holding between X and Y 
on the one hand and between the trajector and the landmark on the other makes 
the horizontal axis the objectification axis. The fact that the latter is connected 
with the vertical line signifies the potential within the capacity of the 
Speaker/Conceptualizer to become part of the communicated message8. This po-
tential can be realized through a change in such elements of the ground as the 
setting or the circumstances of the verbal event (for instance, a change in profes-
sional background of the Speaker). 
In order to further elucidate the objective construal of the verbal event occur-
ring in (3), let us attempt to turn Langacker’s spatial configuration into a linear 
one:
OVA(3) = G {[(BMWx)tr is (doing better than Mercedesy)lm]OS}scope
By integrating a symbolic portrayal of the construing relation with its verbal 
manifestation, this linear configuration offers some additional insight into the 
mutual correspondence of elements of the ground and the stage. It is clear that 
the ground is a category that is ‘superordinate’ toward both the stage and the 
scope of predication, in the sense that some of its elements (the 
Speaker/Conceptualizer, the conceptualizing subject) govern the degree of 
asymmetry between G and the OS. As we shall see, it is the 
Speaker/Conceptualizer that decides whether to become part of the on-stage re-
gion or merely part of the scope of predication. This choice affects in turn the 
linguistic form of the verbal event; in the case of an utterance such as (3), the 
Speaker/Conceptualizer will either enter the OS by explicitly stating the identity 
relationship with the conceptualizing subject (e.g. by means of a determiner) or 
enter the scope alone, by presupposing such relationship. The dominance of the 
ground in evoking the dynamics of G-OS interaction might now seem a trivial 
observation, but in actuality it is going to matter much to the later considerations 
concerning ‘analytic subjectification’. 
So let us imagine now that the claim in (3) is to be made by a person in some 
way associated with the entity indicated by the conceptualizing subject. The per-
son might then state the association explicitly or leave it presupposed. This ren-
ders the form of sentence (3) into a couple of related forms, such as e.g.: 
8 In his description of OVA, Langacker (1990b) uses a vertical arrow, not a vertical line. This 
is, to my mind, insufficient to illustrate the closeness of interaction between elements of the 
ground and the on-stage region (albeit it works elegantly in the description of the process of 
subjectification alone). 
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(4) (Our company) BMW is doing better than Mercedes. 
The parenthesis serves to mark the option the person has in deciding whether to 
be explicit about his/her status toward the subject or not. This choice affects, in 
Langacker’s terms, the position of the ground elements in relation to the stage 
and the scope of predication. If the Speaker/Conceptualizer chooses to voice his 
status toward the conceptualizing subject explicitly and thereby affect the lan-
guage form used, the ground gets positioned within both the on-stage region and 
the scope of predication. Langacker (1990b) terms such move subjectification I.
If, however, the Speaker/Conceptualizer takes it for granted that his status to-
ward the subject is clear for the Hearer and hence merely presupposes his iden-
tity, the ground assumes its position within the scope of predication of the sen-
tence though not within the OS. In the latter case, one talks of the so-called sub-
jectification II (cf. Langacker 1990b)9. The essence of the change in construing 
relation remains identical in both situations; the Speaker/Conceptualizer is no 
longer an objective commentator on the verbal event as his viewing of the OS 
and/or the scope of predication turns largely egocentric. Yet his movement along
the vertical axis or, hence, subjectification axis (cf. Fig. 1) may be of a different 
degree and depth. This kind of difference is reflected in an evident contrast be-
tween Fig. 2 which depicts subjectification I, and Fig. 3 which illustrates subjec-
tification II: 
                               
G
                                                                                      
scope of predication 
Fig. 2. Subjectification I 
9 In Langacker 1999 there is what seems like an implicit return to a more uniform approach to 
the two kinds of subjectification, both seen primarily as the relative increase in the 
prominence of the grounding relationship as a result of the ‘fading away’ of elements of the 
objectively construed relationship. 
Y
X   OS 
tr lm
G
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G
                                                                                      
scope of predication 
Fig. 3. Subjectification II 
3.2. ‘Analytic subjectification’ 
As has been suggested in 2.4, Langacker’s model of subjectification has a poten-
tial which allows an extension beyond its primary scope of application. The cor-
nerstone of this extension is the apparent correspondence between the dynamic 
status of the analyst in relation to the background of the analyzed text and the 
comparably dynamic mechanism of conceptualization of the on-stage region 
(OS) by the Speaker/Conceptualizer in CG model of viewing arrangement of the 
stage in the process of predication. In other words, there exists an analogy be-
tween the Speaker’s/Conceptualizer’s assumption of place within the OS and/or 
within the scope of predication on the one hand, and the positioning of the ana-
lyst as part of the analyzed piece of discourse on the other. Although in the for-
mer case the subjectification involves the conceptualizing party and in the latter 
the discourse-analytic party, the two processes are intrinsically similar and so 
are the initial, objective viewing arrangements which underlie them. Namely, as 
a pre-requisite for the process of ‘analytic subjectification’, the range of the OS 
extends over the analyzed discourse area and the concepts such as trajector and 
landmark, which in the source model of subjectification are the main elements 
of the OS, in the discourse-analytic model turn subordinate to the Speaker’s 
party and the Hearer’s party. Accordingly, both the Speaker and the Hearer be-
come part of thus created ‘discourse stage’. 
           X
Y
      OS 
tr lm
 G
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The analyst’s objective viewing arrangement (OVA) of the discourse stage 
and his/her potential for the accomplishment of the egocentric viewing arrange-
ment (EVA), through the process of the analytic subjectification discussed 
above can be depicted as follows (Fig. 4; “An” indicates “Analyst”): 
Fig. 4. Analytic OVA 
Thus, if a claim such as (3) BMW is doing better than Mercedes was to consti-
tute, say, a speaker’s piece of argument in a larger discourse structure aimed at 
affecting the addressee/hearer in some way, whether mental or physical, then 
any attempt to provide the resulting linear configuration of the objective view-
ing arrangement adopted by the analyst of such discourse structure would neces-
sitate turning Fig. 4 into the following complex transcription: 
OVAanalysis (3) =
An{G[Sil(BMWtr,x is (doing better than Mercedesy)lm)Hperl]}analytic scope10
The proposed linear version may seem an intricate one, however, the relations of 
subordination and superordination indicated by the sophisticated bracketing cast 
much light upon the complexities following from the supra-status of the analyst 
depicted in Fig. 4. The positioning of the categories of S, H, and the message-
bound categories of tr and lm inside of the main brace reflects in the vast range 
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of options the analyst has in entering the stage in the process of the analytic sub-
jectification. Namely, the analyst may become part of the OS by assuming the 
H’s position, or the S’s position, or both. Furthermore, the analyst may become 
part of the OS by demonstrating the expert knowledge of the message formula 
as such, with no clear attachment to, or identification with, the Hearer’s party or 
the Speaker’s party. As we shall see, all those options have their anchoring in 
the nature of the particular types of discourse discussed in subsections 2.1-3. 
The potential of the analytic subjectification can thus be best described by a tri-
angular area (cf. Fig. 5) whose in-ground part specifies the region of the egocen-
tric viewing arrangement (EVA) of the stage by the the analyst, the remaining 
part marking the analyst’s distance to/from the investigated discourse and the 
broken lines indicating patterns of directionality (toward H, toward S, or toward 
message only) from the objective viewing arrangment (OVA) to the egocentric 
one:
Fig. 5: Analytic subjectification 
3.3. Subjectification in the analysis of persuasive discourse
In what follows, we shall make use of the basic arrangement in Fig. 5 to elabo-
rate on these many issues of methodological determination of persuasive dis-
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been observed in 2.4, the position of a given discourse type on the axis of the 
deductive-inductive determination depends, to a large extent, on the analyst’s 
closeness to the discourse under investigation. This translates into the claim that 
by being part of the discourse context, the analyst undergoes overdetermination 
by deductive processes and, conversely, by being out of the discourse context 
the analyst gets overdetermined inductively. Putting this claim into the context 
of subjectification schema indicated by Fig. 5 necessitates a redefinition and the 
resulting restructuring of the triangular configuration for each of the member 
types of persuasive discourse. This task will be covered in the following subsec-
tions 3.3.1-3. The chronology of the presentation will draw upon the (decreas-
ing) degree of subjectification involved; we shall begin with the deduction-
oriented analysis of the discourse of advertising, to end up with the study of the 
discourse of scientific inquiry, a type entailing little or no subjectification at all. 
3.3.1 Discourse of advertising 
The conceptualization of the on-stage region by a discourse-of-advertising ana-
lyst involves a substantial degree of subjectification. The subjectification is pre- 
Fig. 5a. Field of analytic conceptualization in discourse of advertising 
dominantly hearer-directed; the analyst derives the function of a particular dis-
course manifestation from the assumption of the hearer’s position on the dis-
G
tr/lm
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course stage. The role of analysis of the message body in evaluating the function 
is normally negligible, though the analyst may sometimes resort to provision of 
data atypical of the functional hypothesis. These regularities make the in-
elliptical region of the An-tr/lm-H triangle the most genuine portrayal of the 
analyst’s field of conceptualization in the case of the discourse of advertising 
(cf. Fig. 5a). Since there is a clear contrast between the degree of subjectification 
‘via Hearer’ on the one hand and ‘via message’ on the other, the An-H connec-
tion is represented by a continuous line, while the An-tr/lm connection remains 
symbolically ‘dotted’. 
3.3.2. Political discourse 
If one wishes to make a comparison between the fields of analytic conceptuali-
zation as determined by the discourse of advertising and the discourse of poli-
tics, the arrangement in Fig. 5a calls for two major alterations. First, since the 
discourse of politics entails a considerable dose of analytic inductivism, its field 
of conceptualization  must  reach  beyond  the boundaries  of the on-stage region 
Fig. 5b. Field of analytic conceptualization in discourse of politics 
and the ground. Thereby, the process of subjectification can be portrayed in 
terms of a potential, rather than an analytic routine. Consequently, it is also the 
G
tr/lm
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configuration of the relationship holding between the analyst and the 
hearer/addressee that needs a substantial modification. It is quite clear that the 
analyst may enter the OS by identification with H, but it would be an unjustified 
exaggeration to claim that this should constitute an analytic norm. Furthermore, 
in some cases (e.g. of an analysis pursued by a linguist-political scientist or an 
analysis of a text whose function is prescribed by some cultural or institutional 
pre-conditions) it is virtually impossible to specify how much of the analytic 
subjectification occurs as a result of the sole assumption of the H’s position and 
how much (more) is enhanced by the possession of expert knowledge which 
does not necessarily follow from identification with the hearer/addressee. There-
fore it is difficult to conceive of the An-H and An-tr/lm segments being repre-
sented differently. All these observations are reflected in the configuration of-
fered by Fig. 5b below. It should be added that, as has been the case with the 
previous arrangement, the subjectification potential indicated by the An-tr/lm-S 
region remains as yet unfulfilled. 
3.3.3. Discourse of scientific argument 
Finally, let us attempt to provide a configuration of the field of conceptualiza-
tion for a discourse which, as was indicated in 2.3, involves little analytic sub-
jectification or, in a vast majority of cases, no subjectification at all. The dis-
course of scientific argument seems, on the one hand, antithetical to the dis-
course of advertising (cf. 3.3.1); while the latter positions the analyst inside of 
the on-stage region, the former positions him/her, clearly, outside of the OS and 
the ground. The important difference about these extreme manifistations of ana-
lytic determinism lies, however, in the directionality of (actual or potential) sub-
jectification. In the analysis of the discourse of advertising, the subjectification, 
which is actual and almost necessarily present, targets predominantly at the 
Hearer’s party. On the other hand, in the case of scientific language analysis, 
though the process of subjectification is curbed by social reality constraints, its 
potential cannot be possibly described as, specifically, Hearer-, Speaker-, or 
message-directed. The absence of expert knowledge in the analyst is a fact that 
follows from the general absence of the analyst on the discourse stage, which-
ever segment of the S-H axis is talked about. One could in fact assume that a 
hypothetical minority of analysts who are at the same time part of the ‘Hearer’ 
domain is no bigger than that of the analysts who would belong to the ‘Speaker’ 
domain. Therefore, albeit the field of analytic conceptualization for the dis-
course of science remains outside of the ground boundaries, it simultaneously 
extends all over the area between the An-S and An-H directionality lines, with 
no clear attachment to either of them: 
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Fig. 5c. Field of analytic conceptualization in discourse of scientific argument 
4. Conclusion
The present paper has been an attempt to define some of the methodological 
complexities related to (persuasive) discourse determination and, subsequently, 
to present them in terms of selected tenets of Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar. 
It has been shown that at least one cornerstone concept normally associated with 
the CG apparatus, i.e. Subjectification, can feasibly apply to discussions of the 
anchoring of the analyst in discourse, his/her conceptualization of the scope of 
analysis, as well as the analyst’s processing of data and his/her formulation of 
methodological approach to the investigated text. Such a mediating task under-
taken at a discourse-determination level would surely fail but for the pre-
existence of some common ground between the CG and mainstream discourse 
theories at the basic level of a pragmatic analysis of text. Therefore, it needs to 
be stressed that linguistic pragmatics, discourse analysis and cognitive linguis-
tics are all strongly grounded in functional linguistics. This is obviously no less 
true of the strands of cognitive linguistics which developed alongside with Lan-
gacker’s CG and found their manifestations in works by Lakoff (cf. 1987), La-
koff and Johnson (cf. 1980, 1999) or Fauconnier (cf. 1985, 1997). It is an unde-
niable fact that linguistic pragmatics and cognitive linguistics operate, at least 
for the time being, within different layers of linguistic explanation. While lin-
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gantly’ seen as a language component of a status comparable to syntax or se-
mantics (cf. Kalisz 1993, 2001), cognitive linguistics has developed a theory (or 
rather a number of theories) universally applicable to a variety of phenomena 
involving syntax, semantics, pragmatics, phonology, and more. But since at the 
same time linguistic pragmatics is working on, producing, re-producing and re-
formulating its own methodologies such as theories of implicature, illocutionary 
acts, face-management, etc., which all somehow relate, in different degrees, to 
these traditional components, the apparent gap between the explanatory status of 
cognitive linguistics and linguistic pragmatics is starting to shrink (cf. Kalisz 
1993, 2001; Kalisz and Kubi ski 1993; Kubi ski and Stanulewicz 2001; Lan-
gacker 2001). This fact is in turn a recurrent prompt for implementation of mod-
els of cognitive linguistics into studies of discourse determination. 
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ANALIZA DISKURSA I DETERMINACIJA
U SVJETLU TEORIJE SUBJEKTIFIKACIJE
Prilog pokušava premostiti pristupe karakteristi ne za domene lingvisti ke pragmatike, anal-
ize diskurza te kognitivne lingvistike i socijalne psihologije. Tvrdi se da je odre eni tip 
diskursa sam po sebi u specijalisti koj analizi diskurza analiti ki odrednik, tj. diktira svoje 
vlastite metode istraživanja. Te metode mogu biti više odozdolne ili odozgorne orijentacije (v. 
Beaugrande 1997), ovisno o tome koji se tip diskursa istražuje. Tvrdi se da pojedini tipovi 
diskurza koji “uklju uju” analiti ara (tj. gdje je analiti ar sudionik zbivanja o kojima je rije
ili je pak dio publike diskursa) ili su mu “poznatiji” generiraju zapažanja o funkciji i strukturi 
diskursa u razmjerno ranim fazama komponencijalne analize diskursa, ili ak i prije negoli 
sama analiza zapo ne. Kad je tako pretpostavljena globalna funkcija teksta, analiza se nastav-
lja u odozgornom smjeru, tj. prema mikropodatcima koji podupiru polazišnu hipotezu. To se 
npr. doga a u slu aju analize reklamnog diskursa (v. studiju Lutza iz 1990, Myersa iz 1994, 
Goddarda iz 1998 te mnoge druge). S druge se pak strane ini da je analiza diskursa koji ide u 
odozdolnom smjeru rezultat nedovoljnog izvanjezi nog znanja koje je potrebno analiti aru
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kako bi oformio apriorne stavove o tekstu i njegovoj funkciji. To je ograni enje analiti ara 
koji nije dio stvarnosti koja se ispituje i koji se u pravilu bavi dijakronijskim istraživanjem ili 
prou ava diskurs koji je izrazito metafori an. Prvenstveni je cilj priloga, na temelju prou-
avanja nekoliko razli itih tipova diskursa (jezika politike i medija, oglašavanja te znanstvene 
argumentacije), ukazati na mogu nost predvi anja stupnja analiti kog determinizma koji se 
vezuje uz odre enu vrstu teksta. Drugim rije ima, prilog treba pokazati koji tipovi diskursa 
navode na (ili ak diktiraju) odre eni analiti ki pristup (tj. “odozgo prema dolje” ili “odozdo 
prema gore”). Sekundarni je cilj priloga sugerirati da analiza diskursa može profitirati od 
primjene pojmova koji su normalno dio pojmovnog aparata Kognitivne gramatike (KG). Po-
kazuje se da KG može prižiti znatan doprinos utvr ivanju distance izme u analiti ara i 
diskursa koji se prou ava. Razmatra se Langackerov koncept subjektifikacije (usp. Langacker 
1990b i 1999) te njegova relevantnost u razmatranju statusa analiti ara unutar diskursa. 
Klju ne rije i: analiti ka konceptualizacija; deduktivna analiza; determinacija diskursa; 
diskurs reklama; induktivna analiza; politi ki diskurs; pragmati ko-kognitivni me usklop;
znanstveni diskurs; subjektifikacija. 
